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BY FREDERIC DREW BOND.
THEORIES of perception have been confronted by a seeming
contradiction. On the one hand, the sight of an object appears
to the beholder to occnr without the intermediation of any other
thing or of any other process. On the other hand, it is certain that
waves of light fall on the retina of the eye and excite certain
changes in the optic nerve when vision occurs, and it would seem
that this impingement of light must be adverted to first as a change
in the eye itself—in a word, as a "sensation." From such sensations
felt at the retina it would seem as though, at the best, there could
be but a very rapid inference to that part of the physical world
before one's face as an assumed cause of their occurrence. Indeed,
it is certain that our knowledge of the world has actually grown
from earliest childhood in some such manner. Of course, beside the
knowledge gained through the eye itself, other knowledge gained
through the sensibility of the skin, through movement, through the
muscular sense and through possibly other factors is added thereto.
But as it is through eyesight that a view is held firmly in front of
us and made, by this fact of permanence, different from other sorts
of knowledge, it is to vision that attention must be chiefly given in
attempting to untangle the matter.
Now, no matter how quickly we may assume sight of anything
to occur it seems hard to get beyond the fact that the physical change
must first of all be known as a sensation—that is, as an affection of
the part of the body where it first happened ; and that the perception
of its cause must be later—an inference becoming quicker and
quicker and more thorough each time an act of sight has occurred
from birth, but which, no matter how shortened, must in some form
always be there.
Yet if we accept the testimony of consciousness in the matter,
nothing becomes more certain, the closer we examine it, than that no
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inference, no reasoning of the most rudimentary or most abbrevi-
ated sort, occurs when we open our eyes to a view ; the sight is in-
stant, immediate. That something very like an inference did, in some
factors at least, occur in childhood has nothing to do with the fact
that at present every trace of it has vanished. What then does
happen now when we look at an object?
To try and understand the matter, let us take an analogous
instance which may throw some light on the subject. If one will
recall his state of mind when absorbed in reading some intensely
interesting argument or exposition, it will be difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the knowledge derived from the printed page en-
tered the mind directly ; there was no direct consciousness of letters
or words, sentences or paragraphs. We seem to see through the
print, as it were, into the meaning behind it. It is true that the
direction of our attention to the argument is conditioned by the
print before us in a way apparently like that in which our perception
of a stereoscopic view without the aid of the appropriate optical
instrument is conditioned by the disagreeable squint of the eyes to
see in two directions. But just as the stereoscopic view is directly
perceived, so is the argument.
Now it is certain that the argument could not be perceived
without the existence of the words printed. Nor could these words
have been perceived in the past when learning them as a child, with-
out the letters of which they are made ; and again one step farther
back, each letter itself depends for its existence on certain peculiar-
ities of relative shape and size. Finally, each and every one of these
factors, the shapes of the letters, the letters themselves, the words,
had to be known before their meanings when combined could be
learned. All this is obvious enough. Yet this vast complex process
is non-existent in reading. It might be said that the original infer-
ence from relative forms of the letters and thence to words has been
leaped over, so that now the inference is from the original forms of
the letters to the argument at once. Similarly, it might be argued
that we jump from a sensation on the retina at once to the perception
of the sight which it connotes. Undoubtedly this argument simpli-
fies matters ; it is a step in the right direction. Yet it too has still
the fatal difficulty of harking back to an "original sensation" from
which in some way or other we make a lightning-like inference that
no none ever suspected he performed till induced to think so by a
theory. Whereas, if mature consciousness declares anything, it de-
clares that this "original sensation" as now occurring is a myth. It
simply does not exist. I open my eyes and see the avenue of trees
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shade into the distance. But this view is direct, instant. The waves
of light are the accompaniment of no sensation in the eyeball at all.
They accompany immediately and directly the sight of the avenue,
just as the page of the book may (if the book is interesting enough)
excite directly the argument. It is not that an "original sensation"
now occurring is the premise of a consequent, developed perception
;
rather is it that what was the "original sensation" (either in child-
hood or among far distant, lower forms of life in the past) is gone.
Where it once was is now a perception. How can this be?
To understand this, let us ask first of all what we really mean
by a sensation. For if by sensation we mean "feeling"— like pleas-
ure or pain (not a pleasure or a pain) or like emotion—then a per-
ception could not develop from such sensation, for feeling (an
affection of the subject) cannot become knowledge (an intuition of
the object). It is true enough that in common speech the word
sensation often covers feeling as well as knowledge, while it is hard
to say with some writers whether the possibility of this distinction
is at all admitted. The fact is that the sensation itself is simply
knowledge, at the very lowest, of some physical affection of some part
of the body—it is knowledge, whether it be knowledge possessed by
a jelly-fish or by a human being. Always the sensation means some-
thing either to jelly-fish or human being,—even if the meaning
be merely that something is happening. There is hardly a stronger
proof of this fact than the existence of the unnatural, i. e., unusual,
feeling of pleasure or pain which hypnotism can excite on the occa-
sion of a physical stimulus which ordinarily would be accompanied
by feeling of a different sort. As soon as there is a little further
development of mind above that of primitive organisms, a sensation
means that something is happening to the subject at the surface of
the body and is viewed by him in a certain relation to the rest of
the body and to its physical needs.
But this physical agitation of a part of the surface of the body,
though primitively it has this primary meaning of reference merely
to that fact itself or to the physical needs of the body, is not re-
stricted to such meaning. Other meanings to the subject may arise
as circumstances change and as the beholding mind evolves. Now it
is to the later meanings in the course of the development of mind
that wc have come to advert and especially is this so in the case of
sight.
Thus the argument comes to this: We see immediately because,
while a certain physical motion in the retina and optic nerve meant
primitively to the subject that the eye was somehow affected, it also
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could just as truly mean, and in the end came to mean, that some-
thing is occurring in the world outside of the body. The first
meaning was prior in time, in the development of the race and of
the individual, but the latter meaning having been learned, can just
as well be attended to ; and, in the case of sight, so constant have
been the repetitions of seeing and so constantly has it been practical
wisdom for the organism to attend to the later meaning that we have
almost lost the power to know what has occurred within our organ-
ism following the impact of light on the eye, as meaning psychically
(as well as being physically) an affection of the eyeball—so con-
stantly have we come to know it as meaning, what it just as truly
does mean, a manifold of things in the physical world. To mind,
at first, the psychical accompaniment of the light impact was a sen-
sation, now to a mature human mind it is something very different
though something just as true. We see a hill directly and imme-
diately because a hill is the direct and immediate meaning we give
to the organic result of the impingement of the light waves in certain
circumstances. And there is no sensation in mature life at all, be-
cause we utterly ignore the other possible and true meaning of the
organic result of this same light impact.
To make the matter clearer, let us examine it from another
standpoint. We often hear of a picture painted by the rays of light
on the retina. Such a picture may appear on another's eye when
seen with an ophthalmoscope, and such a picture may be seen in my
eyes by another. But to the possessor of the eyes himself, no such
picture exists subjectively at all. Primitively sight may have been
an exquisitely veiled touch such as that experienced when one's
eyes are oversensitive on passing from a darker to a lighter room.
But gradually the veiled touches on this primitive fundus must have
been discriminated in the course of the life of the race and far quicker
in the course of the life of a higher organism after birth. But these
eye-touches to the lower animal as to the child had but the meaning
that that part of his body was somehow affected from without. This
was the first perception, the first inference from the sensation. But
when this inference was established, the perception, such as it was.
became immediate even though the sensation may have persisted
beside it, just as the perception of a rough surface is immediate
when felt with a stick, or just as the perception of the point of a pin
is immediate though the sensation is of the prick. But the sensational
meaning gradually became completely ignored to the benefit of the
perceptual one. This change in the meaning of the same physical
fact in the case of eyesight involved the complete disappearance of
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the sensation under normal conditions, probably through natural se-
lection, because a sensation in the eye necessarily tends to evoke
personal pleasure or pain, and this would be disturbing to the atten-
tion which safety requires to be given to outer objects. This in-
volves that when the retina is electrically irritated and what we call
a flash of light happens, there is no pleasure or pain felt in the eye-
ball. In fact the flash is a perception, though a primitive one ; it is
not the "original sensation" analogous to that given, though not ex-
clusively given, by touch. This is, it seems, in the case of sight,
no longer evocable.
Yet it is possible to revive something near the "original sensa-
tion," an older meaning of the physical result of the light impact.
In proof of this I may recall a personal experience. My first knowl-
edge of Berkeley was obtained when a boy through Huxley's little
essay, and it seemed to me that I entered a new world. As I read
the outline of the theory of vision and concluded that I really saw
nothing of the outer world directly but only knew it through the
intervention of visual signs, on a sudden the whole world of eyesight
seemed to lift away from the room I was in, contract to my eyes
and become a little painted picture on the skin of my face. Never
shall I forget the startlingness of the experience which, however,
my interest rendered awesome and convincing but not terrifying.
A step further would have resolved this picture into shades and
colors, and I dare say had I been reading the original essay of
Berkeley and taken it as seriously as I did Huxley's version, this
might have occurred also. As it was, I apparently went back as
far as one born blind and made afterwards to see.
It may be said that, granting all the foregoing, still this means
only that what we see is seen immediately, but not that it is the outer
world which thus really is immediately seen ; what we get directly
(it may be said) is simply a meaning of the physical change in our
own organism, which we "project" into space. Really, the objection
may proceed, we are interpreting a certain molecular dance in our
eyes and optic nerve, perhaps in the optic thalami, but not the world
outside of the body directly.
In answer to this it may be replied that a molecular dance (if
for brevity's sake we may use this expression) is no more a sensation
than it is a perception. It is simply a bare physical fact without any
meaning merely as such and apart from the attention of the subject.
But its meaning to the subject may be a perception (knowledge of
a state in the physical world) just as well as a sensation (knowledge
of a state in one's own body). Because the physical changes are in
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the body their meaning is not necessarily any more of their own
character than the meaning- of a printed word is of the ink with
which it is printed. To talk of "projecting" into space the meaning
of a physical change in the eyeball is nonsense based on a confusion
of the mental and physical. To the mind there is no such thing as
distance because distance is a physical category. The body is un-
utterable spaces from Sirius but the mind is just as near as to the
chair in one's room. I can "project" a ball into space by the move-
ment of the arm, but to "project" a perception, a meaning, is much
like bounding geographically the theorem of the square on the hy-
potenuse. It is confusing the perception as meaning, as an act of
mind, with the facts perceived (or meant) as actually existing and
interrelated in space, of which facts, of course, the physical body is
one. Meaning may be of here or there, but is neither here nor there,
neither in nor out of the body. Moreover, meaning is necessarily
instant, immediate, otherwise it were still inference, not meaning.
We might say that the mind gathers directly the meaning of the
outer world, which it views through sight, from the physical changes
in its organism, just as it gathers the meaning of an interesting
argument directly from the words of the printed page. The bare
physical facts of the world of matter and energy have in themselves
and apart from our interpretation, no particular meaning at all, not
even that of their own occurrence or of their own configuration ;
thus in interpreting them we may take directly from them the mean-
ing to our organism of their physical relations inter sc (a sensation),
or we may take directly from them, when we can do so, the mean-
ing of other physical facts (as in the case of eyesight) or of concep-
tions (in the case of the printed page).
